I am the John G. Winant Associate Professor in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, and I am a Professorial Fellow at Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. I am an Affiliate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a Nonresident Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program (NPP) at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and a Fellow at Charles University's Peace Research Centre Prague (PRCP). I hold a Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University.
My research examines historical and contemporary challenges in international security, focusing particularly the role of technology--including nuclear weapons--in alliances. My research explores military strategy, deterrence and reassurance, crisis politics, cybersecurity, and security challenges in Europe and Northeast Asia. I use a variety of methodological tools including causal inference, machine learning, historical methods, and survey experiments. My research portfolio includes survey experiments in more than 30 countries.
Learn more about my latest work by following me on Bluesky (@laurensukin.bsky.social) or LinkedIn (@Lauren Sukin). Alongside my academic research, I contribute policy reports and other commentaries to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, among other publications. My writing has appeared in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Washington Post, Arms Control Wonk, The National Interest, The Washington Quarterly, War on the Rocks, and other outlets.
Download a copy of my C.V. here.
My current book project explores how nuclear security guarantees can backfire. Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. In contrast to this approach, I argue that allies are concerned about risk management in nuclear alliances. When their patrons are reckless, allies will fear being dragged into precipitous conflict and worry about unwanted nuclear use. Fears of nuclear escalation by patrons can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent military capabilities as a way to gain intra-alliance leverage. Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. alliances in East Asia and Europe, this project explores the conditions under which the nuclear umbrella can fail to reassure.
This work builds on an article published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution. In this article, I examine the effectiveness of demonstrations of resolve meant to reassure allies, using two waves of survey experiments fielded in South Korea. The evidence shows that overly credible demonstrations of resolve can threaten allies. In particular, confidence that the United States would use nuclear weapons in a conflict with North Korea increases South Koreans' support for nuclear proliferation. Mediation analysis reveals respondents want to avoid becoming embroiled in a U.S.-driven conflict with North Korea and see proliferation as a way to shift nuclear responsibility on the Korean Peninsula away from the United States. This finding upends the conventional understanding of nuclear security guarantees, which views these guarantees as substitutes for nuclear proliferation if the patron's promise of nuclear retaliation is credible.
University of Oxford, Instructor
University of London Worldwide, Convener
LSE, Instructor
Stanford University, Teaching Assistant
Find up-to-date information about my teaching on my C.V.
lauren.sukin@politics.ox.ac.uk
Dr. Lauren Sukin
Nuffield College & Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford
New Rd, Oxford OX1 1NF, United Kingdom
Pronouns: She/Her
Pronunciation: Lor-ren Soo-kin
