I am the John G. Winant Associate Professor in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, and I am a Professorial Fellow at Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. I am an Affiliate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a Nonresident Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program (NPP) at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Statecraft & National Security at King's College London, and a Fellow at Charles University's Peace Research Centre Prague (PRCP). I hold a Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University.
My research examines historical and contemporary challenges in international security, focusing particularly the role of technology--including nuclear weapons--in alliances. My research explores military strategy, deterrence and reassurance, crisis politics, cybersecurity, and security challenges in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula. I use a variety of methodological tools including causal inference, historical methods, and survey experiments. My portfolio includes survey experiments in more than 30 countries.
My latest work can be found on X (@Lauren_Sukin), Bluesky (@laurensukin.bsky.social), or LinkedIn (@Lauren Sukin). I contribute policy reports and other commentaries to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, among other publications. My writing has appeared in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Washington Post, Arms Control Wonk, The National Interest, The Washington Quarterly, War on the Rocks, and other outlets.
Download a copy of my C.V. here.
My current book project explores how credible nuclear security guarantees can backfire. Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. In contrast to this approach, I argue that credible nuclear guarantees can backfire. These guarantees can cause clients to fear that their guarantors will drag them into a precipitous nuclear conflict. Fears of nuclear escalation by their guarantor can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent nuclear capabilities. Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. alliances in East Asia and Europe, this project explores the risks of credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees.
This work builds on an article published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution. In this article, I examine the effectiveness of demonstrations of resolve meant to reassure allies, using two waves of survey experiments fielded in South Korea. The evidence shows that overly credible demonstrations of resolve can threaten allies. In particular, highly credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees increase South Koreans' support for nuclear proliferation. Mediation analysis reveals respondents want to avoid becoming embroiled in a U.S.-driven conflict with North Korea and see proliferation as a way to shift nuclear responsibility on the Korean Peninsula away from the United States. This finding upends the conventional understanding of nuclear security guarantees, which views these guarantees as substitutes for nuclear proliferation.
University of Oxford, Instructor
University of London Worldwide, Convener
LSE, Instructor
Stanford University, Teaching Assistant
Find up-to-date information about my teaching on my C.V.
lauren.sukin@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
@Lauren_Sukin
Dr. Lauren Sukin
Nuffield College & DPIR
University of Oxford
New Rd, Oxford OX1 1NF, United Kingdom
Pronouns: She/Her
Pronunciation: Lor-ren Soo-kin
